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The rhetoric and practice of the ‘ownership’ of
security sector reform processes in fragile countries:
the case of Kosovo
Selver B. Sahin
ABSTRACT
Successful outcomes in security sector reform (SSR) implementation are often
conditioned on two key inter-related operational principles: international
agencies’ understanding of the ‘local context’ where they intervene and their
encouragement of the country ‘ownership’ of the institutional reforms they
advocate. Outcomes, however, are determined by power, and different
patterns of outcomes are likely to emerge from different types and degrees of
power exercised by a multiplicity of actors operating in a dynamic political
and social context. Drawing upon these inter-connections between outcomes
and power, this article examines Kosovo’s security sector development
experience since 1999. It argues that depending on types of, and changes in,
power-based interplays between international and domestic forces, different
patterns of ‘ownership’ have emerged in the context of SSR implementation
in Kosovo.
Responding to domestic governance deficits in the developing world has been
at the centre of the international peacebuilding agenda since it was first for-
mulated in the Secretary-General’s ‘Agenda for Peace’.1 In this landmark
UN document released in 1992 and many other related international policy
reports produced since then,2 peace is conceptualized by reference to conflict
and insecurity that are associated with the inability of the state to enforce law
and order over its territory and meet the basic security needs of its citizens in
an effective and democratic way. Poor or bad governance, from this perspec-
tive, causes violent conflict, and the UN and other international agencies
should provide ‘support for the transformation of deficient national structures
and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions’ in
order to ‘solidify’ peace.3 Security sector reform (SSR) represents this insti-
tutions-focused approach to peacebuilding: that is, enabling conditions of
durable peace requires the creation of effective state security institutions
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
CONTACT Selver B. Sahin selver.sahin@bilkent.edu.tr
1UN, ‘An Agenda for Peace’.
2Among others, see, for example, UN, A More Secure World; UN, ‘Securing Peace and Development’; OECD/
DAC, Supporting Statebuilding; DFID, Eliminating World Poverty; World Bank, 2011 World Development
Report; UNDP, Peace for Governance.
3UN, ‘An Agenda for Peace’, para. 59.
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operating in accordance with human rights, transparency, accountability,
social inclusion and the rule of law.
The first SSR programme was put into practice in Sierra Leone in 1997 as
part of the country’s United Kingdom-assisted post-conflict reconstruction
process, and has since then become integral to peacebuilding initiatives under-
taken from Afghanistan to the Solomon Islands. It is, at the same time, widely
recognized that SSR is essentially a very sensitive undertaking. The involvement
of foreign actors in security and defence-related issues that are considered to be
‘the traditional cornerstones of state sovereignty’4 has the potential to create
tensions between international and national actors. In addition to this, ‘con-
flict-affected’ and ‘fragile’ states where security institutions are fractured
along ethnic or tribal lines and form part of the security problem offer the
least favourable conditions for institutional restructuring.5 For instance, in
Timor-Leste, where the UN was mandated to assist with the reform of the
national security sector following the 2006 security breakdown, the national
government insisted on ‘solving their problems’ in a ‘Timorese way’6 and
showed little interest in implementing UN recommendations, including a vig-
orous vetting process for the military, prosecution of police officers linked to
the violence in 2006 and clearly delineating the roles and responsibilities of
the police and themilitary.7 Undoubtedly, SSR programmes go beyond techni-
cal endeavours to include highly sensitive political tasks that require redistribu-
tion of power along liberal democratic principles. For instance, civilian control
of armed forces, which is a key element of democratic security sector develop-
ment, entails rearrangement of existing power relations. The reform process
may result in existing civilian authorities consolidating their position and the
power of interest groups they represent or align with. It may also be possible
for reforms to generate resistance from disgruntled groups whose interests
are threatened, resulting in spikes in violence or forced change of power. As evi-
denced by repeated peacebuilding interventions focusing on state institutions
in Timor-Leste, Somalia, Haiti, Cote D’Ivoire, Liberia and the Democratic
Republic of Congo, the results in building democratically functioning, compe-
tent security institutions have been less than successful.
In an attempt to overcome these shortcomings, two inter-related oper-
ational principles were developed and prioritized in donor discourses for
more successful SSR outcomes: that is, international actors’ understanding
of the ‘local context’ where they are intervening and their encouragement
of the country ‘ownership’ of the institutional reforms advocated.8 From
4OECD/DAC, OECD–DAC Handbook, 29; DFID, Understanding and Supporting, 13.
5OECD/DAC, OECD-DAC Handbook, 29.
6Pinto, ‘UNMIT Mission’.
7International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Timor-Leste’; Sahin and Feaver, ‘Politics of Security Sector Reform’.
8OECD/DAC, OECD-DAC Handbook; UN, ‘Securing Peace and Development’; OECD/DAC, Security System
Reform: What Have We Learned?; UN, ‘Securing Peace and Development’; UN, ‘Securing States and
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this perspective, intervening actors should pay more attention to the needs,
concerns and practices of local populations through participatory approaches.
The institutional reforms and policy frameworks devised in accordance with
local needs and demands are thought to be ‘owned’ at the national level and
more successful and sustainable results would thus be achieved.
Outcomes, on the other hand, are determined by power, and different pat-
terns of outcomes are likely to emerge from different types and degrees of
power exercised by a multiplicity of actors operating in a dynamic political
and social context. Power, in other words, is not an object that one actor pos-
sesses and another does not. It is rather an attribute of a ‘relational’ experience
that is bound to be both asymmetric and interdependent.9 This means that
actors perform a ‘function’ for each other and are therefore dependent on
each other, and if a particular actor is ‘more dependent on’ another, the
latter has power over the former.10 Looked at this way, power can be exam-
ined in terms of actors’ attempts to exercise mutual influence on outcomes
as the forms of constraints they use against each other are rooted in the ‘par-
ticular nature of their relatedness and interdependence as players’.11 Applying
this approach to power as a relational experience to the analysis of the dom-
estic landscape within which SSR measures are negotiated and implemented
may help us better understand and explain (rather than describe) as to how
‘ownership’ in effect develops through domestic and international agencies’
mutual dependencies and relative ability to use different modes of power
(such as legitimization and appropriation) to influence outcomes.
Taking these inter-connections between outcomes and power as a point of
departure, this study aims to contribute to the peacebuilding literature on SSR
‘ownership’ through offering an analysis of types of ‘ownership’ that are deter-
mined by power-based interplays occurring in a dynamic ‘local context’. It
does so by using a conceptual framework that helps identify how actors’
mutual dependencies shape and constrain their ability to influence policy
decisions and actions, as manifested in Kosovo’s SSR experience since the
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) intervention in 1999. It is
argued that depending on forms of, and changes in, power relationships
between international and domestic forces, different patterns of ‘ownership’
have emerged in the context of SSR implementation in Kosovo.
The article is organized into three main sections. It begins with a concep-
tual discussion of ‘local context’ and ‘ownership’. The second part elaborates
on an analytical framework that is employed to the study of Kosovo’s SSR
experience. This analytical framework previously referred to by Bu Wilson
Societies’; Scheye and Peake, ‘Unknotting Local Ownership’; Nathan, No Ownership, No Commitment;
Donais, ‘Understanding Local Ownership’; Mobekk, ‘Security Sector Reform’.




in her work on the ‘local ownership’ of the UN-led police reform process in
Timor-Leste12 constitutes a useful tool for the examination of the SSR activi-
ties in Kosovo. The final section is focused on the political and operational
dimensions of these two principles in relation to Kosovo’s security sector
development experience.
Local context and ownership: a conceptual analysis
The idea that context-specific, ‘bottom–up’ strategies should be pursued to
operationalize ‘ownership’ is now mainstreamed into the peacebuilding
agenda for more successful results. The ‘rediscovery of the local’ in the face
of failures of ‘top–down’ peacebuilding measures13 has received specific
emphasis in relation to SSR implementation, which aims to foster democratic
governance and deliver more effective justice and security through insti-
tutional measures.14 Yet, the principles of treating the ‘local context’ as the
main reference point and achieving country ‘ownership’ prioritized at the
policy level for ‘good international engagement in fragile states and situ-
ations’15 are not only characterized by a series of ambiguities and contradic-
tions but run the risk of appropriation by policy-makers to justify and
reinforce their regulatory practices.16
To start with the conceptual ambiguities and operational contradictions
surrounding these two externally devised principles to bolster local compli-
ance, it remains unclear what specifically forms the ‘local context’. A brief over-
view of OECD/DAC guidelines suggests that donors should: (1) ‘take context
as the starting point’;17 (2) possess the knowledge about the history and politics
of a country in which they are intervening; and (3) consider how the existing
patterns of state–society relations, sources of legitimacy and the balance of
power between different social groups will be affected by their interventions.18
In facilitation of the production of context-specific, detailed analysis of the
local capacity, political will and understandings of legitimacy, intervening
actors are also advised (1) to use methodological approaches that go ‘beyond
quantitative indicators of conflict, governance or institutional strength’, and
(2) distinguish between different situations and degrees of political transition,
deteriorating governance environments and crisis situations to be able to better
respond to specific country and regional needs.19
12Wilson, Smoke and Mirrors.
13Mac Ginty, ‘Where Is the Local?’
14Scheye, ‘Unknotting Local Ownership Redux’.
15OECD/DAC, ‘Principles for Good International Engagement’.
16Mac Ginty, ‘Where Is the Local?’
17OECD/DAC, ‘Principles for Good International Engagement’. https://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/
countries/countries-content/nepal/en/38368714.pdf (accessed June 9, 2016).
18OECD/DAC, Do No Harm.
19Ibid., 147.
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However, the implementation of the principle of ‘taking context as the
starting point’ has been mixed, as documented in donor reports. A 2005
OECD/DAC global survey of non-OECD countries’ views on the SSR
policy agenda, for instance, suggests that ‘[d]onors often lack adequate under-
standing of the country in which they are engaging, in particular relating to
how countries perceive and define security threats, how security institutions
function, and the concerns of the reforming government’.20 A more recent
OECD/DAC study on the implementation of the principles for good inter-
national engagement in fragile states found that ‘the analytical effort required
to understand the country context has not always been shared [… ] or sus-
tained [… ] [and] actual programming has not always been adequately
rooted in an understanding of the country context’.21 In most cases, the exer-
cise of reviews, consultations and evaluations, in other words, turned into one
of ‘box-ticking’ to formally comply with documentary requirements priori-
tized in donor guidelines. It is also a general problem that different actors
produce different interpretations of domestic and regional dynamics. These
‘multiple and fragmented analyses’ of the realities on the ground make it
extremely difficult to devise coherent and sequential policy instruments
around commonly agreed development priorities, undermining the overall
benefits of capacity-building programmes.22
When it comes to the related principle of ‘ownership’, it also suffers from
conceptual ambiguities, loose definitions and contradictory practices that
further undermine its already problematic substance and value. In its literal
meaning, the term ‘ownership’ refers to the legal right of possession and is
taken to mean promoting local ‘buy-in’ to internationally advocated insti-
tutional reforms when used in relation to peacebuilding programmes.23
However, what this buy-in entails and how it should be ensured remains
debateable. For instance, should ‘ownership’ be based on local actors’ respon-
siveness to, participation in or control over SSR decisions?24 Some analysts
take it too far to argue that recipient countries should be ‘appreciative of
the benefits of policy measures’.25 For some others, on the other hand, own-
ership can only be realized if SSR measures are ‘designed, managed and
implemented by domestic actors rather than external actors’.26 While the
latter approach is privileged in donor discourses, in practice international
actors remain reluctant to relinquish or share authority and control over
the reform process.27 Most of the time, ‘ownership’ is reduced to generating
20OECD/DAC, Security System Reform and Governance, 61.
21OECD/DAC, Monitoring the Principles, 10.
22Ibid.
23Chesterman, ‘Ownership in Theory’, 4, 9.
24Ibid.; Nathan, ‘Challenge of Local Ownership’.
25Bendix and Stanley, ‘Deconstructing Local Ownership’, 95.
26Nathan, ‘Challenge of Local Ownership’, 21.
27Donais, ‘Inclusion or Exclusion?’, 120.
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domestic support for donor-driven projects rather than the other way
around.28
Various factors underlie this reluctance to put locals in the driver’s seat.
One of them is the conviction that local actors (particularly civil society)
lack the relevant SSR knowledge and expertise.29 From this conviction
follows doubts about the ability of local agencies to agree on any single
approach or desired outcome.30 Domestic elites’ commitment to liberal
democracy and improved democratic security governance also becomes a
matter of concern, as reforms can be used as a means to strengthen their
capacity to eliminate dissent or weaken political opponents.31
These evaluations can be criticized in several respects. First, domestic
actors may not have the requisite knowledge and capacity to draft the
needed SSR policies and plans especially after instances of violent conflict
and governmental collapse; however, this is precisely what external actors
are mandated to do – assisting with capacity-development rather than deliver-
ing these functions for them.32 In fact, civil society actors may well possess
relevant expertise but their suggestions are often ignored or go unacknow-
ledged.33 Second, free and open contestation of policies and interests is an
integral component of democracy that underpins SSR.34 Third, donors’ per-
ception or treatment of local actors as being ‘incapable’ or ‘illiberal’ leads to
a contested reform process characterized by growing resentment and resist-
ance since reforms are regarded as externally imposed solutions.35 Lastly, uti-
lizing local knowledge and resources requires appreciation of indigenous
practices and customs. However, it is important to recognize that local com-
munities are contested ‘sites of heterogeneity’ and idealised interpretations of
the local as ‘benign’ are misleading.36 It is equally misguided to assume that
every elite in a host country is ‘illiberal’ or local civil society organizations
are ‘ineffective’. Illiberal elites can be compromised with the help of liberal
elites. Local individuals and organizations can be very effective when it
comes to raising awareness about certain issues or to disseminate the liberal
values the UN and other international actors support.37
Another recurrent theme in the ‘ownership’ literature is agency. While
almost everyone agrees on the need for achieving ‘country ownership’ of
SSR measures, there is a lack of consensus on who exactly constitutes ‘local
28Nathan, ‘Challenge of Local Ownership’, 21.
29Bendix and Stanley, ‘Deconstructing Local Ownership’, 98–9.
30Nathan, ‘Challenge of Local Ownership’, 22.
31Donais, ‘Inclusion or Exclusion’, 121.
32Nathan, ‘Challenge of Local Ownership’.
33Bendix and Stanley, ‘Deconstructing Local Ownership’, 99.
34Nathan, ‘Challenge of Local Ownership’, 22.
35Von Billerbeck, ‘Local Ownership and UN Peacebuilding’.
36Mac Ginty, ‘Where Is the Local?’; see also Richmond, ‘De-Romanticising the Local’, 847.
37I am grateful to my research assistant Mr. Levent Ozan for bringing these points to my attention and
allowing me to incorporate them into this article.
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stakeholders’ and what specifically they are supposed to ‘own’.38 As a policy
recommendation, the engagement of all government bodies and inclusion
of larger segments of society including the poor, women, children and
other vulnerable groups are singled out as a necessary condition for successful
SSR outcomes.39 Facilitating the representation of society at large or ‘liberal
ownership’ promises a more democratic, equitable and reliable peacebuilding
strategy that fits the UN’s normative agenda of constructing a liberal political
environment. In practice, however, it is not deemed efficient in attaining
short-term operational objectives such as the disarmament of belligerents,
reconstruction of the physical infrastructure, repatriation of refugees and
organization of elections.40
Involving challenging long-term mandates of conflict transformation such
as building functioning institutions and consolidating democratic practices,
peace operations also seek to achieve behavioural and attitudinal change
through encouraging the engagement of local actors including former comba-
tants, political elites, bureaucrats, community groups and other social actors
who are concerned with the extent to which their interests are represented
and their participation is enabled.41 An effective delivery of these transforma-
tive objectives requires the exercise of power by international actors in ways
that encourage local ‘buy-in’ to peacebuilding projects and facilitate handover
of political responsibilities to domestic institutions in a timely manner.42
Therefore, legitimacy becomes a critical factor in generating local compliance
because the rules or norms institutions issue are not complied as a result of
externally imposed stimuli (i.e. sanctions of punishment or rewards) but an
‘internal sense of moral obligation’.43 In addition to compliance, it also motiv-
ates cooperation between locals and a peace operation whose ability to shape
the behaviour of local actors and achieve its transformative responsibilities is
dependent on the degree to which it is perceived to be ‘right, fair, and appro-
priate in the local context’.44 This makes legitimacy ‘more than just another
source of power’ as it enables the power of international actors which they
develop from other ‘currencies of power’ such as coercion and inducement.45
However, legitimacy, being an inter-subjectively constituted process, also
creates constraints on institutions whose claim to legitimacy can be rejected
by actors based on their perceptions of effectiveness and appropriateness.46
Taken altogether, these operational limitations arising from tensions
38Martin and Wilson, ‘Security Sector Evolution’.
39UN, ‘Securing Peace and Development’.
40Von Billerbeck, ‘Local Ownership and UN Peacebuilding’.
41Whalan, How Peace Operations Work.
42Ibid.
43Gippert, ‘Exploring Local Compliance’, 58.
44Whalan, How Peace Operations Work, 76.
45Ibid., 63.
46Gippert, ‘Exploring Local Compliance’.
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between the long-term requirements of overly ambitious tasks and the short-
term priorities of international actors searching for exit strategies create an
‘ownership dilemma’.47 This is why the reform process is most of the time
confined to the participation of ruling elites and security professionals who
are thought to have the needed SSR expertise and capacity.48 This way of con-
ceiving ‘locals’ implies the presence of supposedly united actors and insti-
tutions around shared security goals and interests.49 A closer look into the
domestic policy landscape, on the other hand, reveals how different social
groups including state actors with competing agendas and relative capabilities
produce and reproduce shifting coalitions and networks of interests to secure
their access to political power and wealth.50
As noted earlier, SSR is a highly sensitive political process as it entails the
engagement of foreign actors in security and defence affairs in the host state
and changing domestic dynamics of power through rearranging the way in
which political power is distributed and exercised along democratic lines.
The language of ‘ownership’ enables external donors to gain access to these sen-
sitive areas in conflict-affected countries51 and mask the extent of power and
influence they exert over domestic policy making without any accountability
to the local population through casting their role as facilitators of democratic
self-governance.52 It also helps legitimize their intrusive international engage-
ment in the domestic sphere through a promise of a more human-centric con-
flict transformation agenda.53 For instance, promoting ‘community
empowerment’ occupies a central place in peacebuilding discourses. Multi-
million dollar projects are executed by local personnel in specific local commu-
nities; however, the real power resides with donors who provide themoney and
determine ‘what the local is’ and which concepts and strategies should be
pursued.54 Rather than producing real human security outcomes for the
target populations, these seemingly locally driven projects are co-opted to per-
petuate the hierarchies of power. The host government acts more accountably
to foreign donors than their own citizens, many of whom are distanced from
internationally regulated governing institutions and continue to live in
poverty and under threats of renewed violence.55
International frameworks of regulation and monitoring take different
forms ranging from the placement of foreign officials as co-workers or line
47Whalan, How Peace Operations Work, 32.
48Gordon, ‘Security Sector Reform’, 129.
49Ibid.; Bendix and Stanley, ‘Deconstructing Local Ownership’, 96.
50For a detailed analysis of competing societal interests in the context of Timor-Leste’s security sector
development process, see Sahin and Feaver, ‘Politics of Security Sector Reform’.
51Bendix and Stanley, ‘Deconstructing Local Ownership’, 94, 101.
52Chandler, Empire in Denial.
53Mac Ginty, ‘Where Is the Local?’
54Ibid.
55Chandler, Empire in Denial.
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managers in critical state institutions such as the police service, finance and
justice departments to overseas aid programmes and organizational member-
ship processes conditioned on the adoption of certain policies and reforms.56
It is, however, misleading to describe the interactions between intervening and
domestic parties in homogenized or dualistic terms as occurring between all-
powerful foreigners and all-disadvantaged, submissive locals. This is not to
‘romanticize’ the capacity and agency of the local as Mac Ginty and Richmond
warn against. It is rather to point out that power, as noted in the introduction,
is not something that one actor possesses and another lacks completely.
Power, following Elias, rather arises from a ‘relational’ process that is charac-
terized by asymmetries and interdependencies, as actors perform a ‘function’
for each other.
When this notion of power as a relational attribute is applied to the analysis
of the policy spaces in intervened states, it becomes clear that the power-based
relationships between foreign peace-builders and local political groups are
determined by their agendas rooted in mutual dependencies. In this relation-
ship, the former are concerned with the execution of peacebuilding pro-
grammes which requires the consent of local elites, while the latter seek to
attain international support to achieve their ultimate political aspirations.
The policy sphere turns into a site ofmutually reinforcing agendas where inter-
national and local political objectives are brought into some sort of mutually
supporting balance. Practices of positive remarks and praising become a key
feature of this process. International agencies need success stories for the justi-
fication and legitimization of their presence and the policy reforms they advo-
cate. Loudly praised accounts of developing local performance and publically
expressed stories about progress with stability and democratic governance
serve to continue with implementation of existing peacebuilding agendas
and strategies, and provide a convincing reference point for promoting neo-
liberal policy agendas in other fragile or conflict-affected countries.
This is why many recipient governments avoid explicitly rejecting interna-
tionally advocated reform programmes, as they do not want to be deprived of a
variety of opportunities these programmes carry such as gaining access to
financial resources, international recognition and legitimacy. Rather than
saying ‘no’ to international agencies, they express their commitment to a
democratic security sector and other institutional reforms at the policy level,
while appropriating these reforms into existing power structures and practices.
Rather than a liberal democratic transformation, the emerging social environ-
ment under these circumstances becomes one of ‘hybrid peace’which, accord-
ing to Boege57 and Richmond,58 refers to a situation in which externally
56Chandler, International Statebuilding.
57Boege, ‘Hybrid Forms of Peace’.
58Richmond, ‘Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace’.
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promoted liberal democratic policies and principles co-exist with illiberal and
undemocratic practices and norms. Hybrid forms of peace emerging from local
agency in an attempt to resist externally prescribed policy measures often
evolve through different strategies of resistance including opposition, limited
co-operation, co-option or manipulation of newly crafted institutions, and
the articulation of public demands for the localization of governance structures
asmanifested in the ‘Kosovanization’, ‘Timorization’ and ‘Afghanization’ cam-
paigns initiated against state-building administrations.59 Examples of peace-
building as resistance also include the SSR efforts in the Democratic
Republic of Congo and Rwanda where local actors managed to ‘transform’60
or keep the reform process in such a way that enabled them to ‘claim local own-
ership, radically different from the discursive and rhetorical local ownership
usually found in these circumstances’.61
The analytical framework to apply to the study of
internationally promoted ssr in fragile settings
Sherry Arnstein’s conceptualization of a ‘ladder of citizen participation’,62
which Wilson refers to in her analysis of the ‘local ownership’ of the UN-
assisted reform of the East Timorese police,63 offers a useful analytical frame-
work to examine how ‘ownership’ takes form in the context of internationally
promoted institutional reforms and governance models. In her 1969 seminal
work focused on urban transformation participation in the USA, Arnstein
suggests that genuine public participation requires reorganization of power
that enables citizens to get included in determining how information is dis-
tributed, policies and programmes are set and managed. Noting that ‘[t]
here is a critical difference between going through the empty ritual of partici-
pation and having the real power needed to affect the outcome of the
process’,64 Arnstein develops an eight-rung ladder to distinguish between
different degrees of participation (Figure 1):65
1. Manipulation: No participation occurs. The objective is not to enable
people to participate but ‘educate’ them and ‘engineer’ their support for
pre-determined outcomes. In the name of participation, citizens are
placed on rubberstamp committees, advised and persuaded by officials.
2. Therapy: It is non-participative. Citizens are involved in extensive activity
but the objective is to ‘cure’ their ‘pathology’ rather than changing the
structural conditions that permit such ‘pathologies’ to occur. In doing
59Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace.
60Rayroux and Wilen, ‘Resisting Ownership’.
61Wilen, ‘Hybrid Peace’, 1331.
62Arnstein, ‘Ladder of Citizen Participation’.
63Wilson, Smoke and Mirrors, 19–25.
64Arnstein, ‘Ladder of Citizen Participation’, 216.
65Ibid., 217–23.
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so, frustrations are appeased and public support for an already decided
strategy is secured.
3. Informing: It constitutes an important first step towards legitimate public
participation. However, there exist no real channels for feedback and nego-
tiation, as the flow of information takes place in one direction – from offi-
cials to citizens. The use of media tools, brochures and posters exemplifies
this tokenistic level of involvement.
4. Consultation: Citizens are provided with feedback mechanisms such as
attitude surveys, neighbourhood meetings or public inquiries. However,
it may still be a window dressing ritual, if citizens are not given any assur-
ance that their ideas will be accepted or taken into account.
5. Placation: Citizens begin to exercise some degree of influence as they are
enabled to join the planning process but tokenism is still apparent. This
is exemplified by the placement of a few hand-picked ‘worthy’ have-nots
on boards of community action or housing. They can advise or make rec-
ommendations about a proposed plan but traditional power holders
holding majority of seats still retain the right to accept or reject the advice.
6. Partnership: Power is redistributed through negotiation between citizens
and power holders. Planning and decision-making responsibilities are
shared through joint committees and dispute resolution mechanisms
such as bargaining processes. Once the ground rules are established
through mutual concessions; they cannot be changed unilaterally.
7. Delegated power: Citizens exercising dominant decision-making authority
over a particular programme as a result of negotiations with officials. The
public holds power to assure accountability of the programme to them.
For example, residents having majority of decision-making seats on
model city policy boards or community action agencies operating with
the authority and resources to prepare planning programmes, hire (and
fire) their own staff.
Figure 1. Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation. Arnstein, ‘A Ladder of Citizen Partici-
pation’, 217, reprinted by permission of the American Planning Association, www.
planning.org.
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8. Citizen control: Citizens holding authority to govern a programme and
being in full charge over its planning, policy-making and managerial
aspects. Neighbourhood corporations with no intermediaries between
them and the source of funds can be given as an example.
Using Arnstein’s ‘ladder of participation’ as an analytical tool, the follow-
ing section elaborates on Kosovo’s SSR experience by reference to the patterns
of power relationships between national and international actors over time.
The process of security sector development in Kosovo
Kosovo’s experience with security sector development can be examined on
the basis of three timeframes. The first period which covers between the
establishment of the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
in June 1999 as per Security Council Resolution 1244 and adoption of ‘stan-
dards before status’ policy demonstrates combined elements of manipu-
lation, therapy and informing. Manipulation is evidenced by the
formation of seemingly participatory transitional institutions such as the
Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC). The KTC was created in July 1999 as
a consultative body to give Kosovars an ‘opportunity for direct input into
the decision-making process of UNMIK’.66 In reality, however, it had no
substantial authority, as all legislative and executive powers resided with
the head of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General
(SRSG), who also appointed KTC members. Therapy becomes clear in the
initiatives taken by Bernard Kouchner, the first SRSG, to appease the frus-
trations of some Albanian parties that felt excluded from the political
process. This included the enlargement of KTC membership from 12 to
3467 and adoption of the law in force prior to the revoking of Kosovo’s
autonomy in March 1989 as the applicable law68 in an attempt to dissolve
all existing ‘parallel institutions’ of security, revenue collection and public
services, and encourage disgruntled Albanian parties’ participation in the
UNMIK-supervised institutions.69 The decision to change the applicable
law is striking in terms of illustrating power as being a relational attribute
of actors deriving from mutual dependencies. It was taken to secure the
cooperation of Albanians with the international administration following
their universal boycott of the courts that left the judiciary in almost com-
plete paralysis.70
66UNMIK, ‘UNMIK Convenes First Meeting’.
67UN, ‘UN Interim Administration Mission’.
68UNMIK, ‘UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24’.
69For details, see David Holley, ‘Kosovo Factions’ Differences Apparent at Council Meeting’, Los Angeles
Times, 22 Aug. 1999.
70Yannis, ‘Kosovo under International Administration’, 34.
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Informing is evidenced by the prevailing patterns of one-way flow of com-
munication (from UNMIK to locals) regarding general aspects of institutional
structuring in the form of regulations the SRSG issued or pamphlets, TV/
radio programmes providing information on the internationally supervised
local and parliamentary elections or on aspects of the agreements concluded
with Kosovar leaders. One of the key agreements concerned the transform-
ation of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army). NATO, entrusted with final
authority over all aspects of security in Kosovo, was responsible for oversight
of the demobilization of the KLA. The demobilization and transformation of
the KLA was carried out according to the ‘Undertaking of Demilitarization
and Transformation’ agreed between the NATO and KLA leaderships on
21 June 1999. While it was noted in the said agreement that the formation
of a national army should be given ‘due consideration’ by the international
community, the creation of a civilian emergency agency (known as the
Kosovo Protection Corps, KPC) and a multi-ethnic police force (Kosovo
Police Service, KPS) was pushed forward by international actors to transform
the KLA. The KPC was modelled on the Sécurité Civile of France to provide
emergency and reconstruction services in Kosovo and planned to consist of
around 3,000 active duty personnel and 2,000 reservists that would be
largely drawn from KLA ranks.71 The registration and subsequent screening
of some 20,000 former guerrillas was carried out by the International Organ-
ization for Migration (IOM) by the end of 1999.72 It was formally constituted
in January 2000 with the SRSG’s appointment of its 46 key leaders and it
reached its authorised strength of 5,052 (except most of the 500 slots reserved
for minorities) in two months’ time.73
In the absence of a Ministry of Interior Affairs, the construction of a pro-
fessional, multi-ethnic police force was run by UNMIK’s Justice and Police
Pillar. The KPS designed as a force of 5,000–7,000 police officers was
created in September 1999 with the establishment of a police school in
north central Kosovo by the OSCE (Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe), the lead organization for the institution-building
component of UNMIK. In the first group, around 200 cadets selected from
more than 19,000 applicants received a nine-week basic training at the KPC
school followed by a 19-week field training provided by UNMIK Police.74
As of mid-2001, around 4,000 candidates graduated from the KPS school,
with the targeted quotas for minority and women participation (15 per cent
for both) being achieved.75 Compared to the KPC which was not ‘owned’
71UNMIK, ‘UNMIK Regulation No. 8’.
72International Organization for Migration (IOM), ‘Kosovo Reintegration Efforts’; UNMIK, ‘Kosovo Protection
Corps’.
73UNMIK, ‘Kosovo Protection Corps’.
74UN, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Mission’, para. 44.
75O’Neill, Kosovo, 112.
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by minority communities due to its legacy as a successor to the KLA or an
‘army in waiting’, the KPS was widely regarded as the most successful part
of UNMIK’s mandate.76 However, the absorption of former KLA fighters
into the police as a law enforcement agency remained a cause for concern
regarding its professionalism and neutrality among Serbs and others.77
All the security sector development initiatives taken during the initial
phase were placed beyond the authoritative realm of local institutions, includ-
ing the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) established by the
Constitutional Framework that entered into force in May 2001.78 The division
of responsibilities between ‘transferred’ and ‘reserved’ powers further illus-
trates practices of therapy. Through creating provisional institutions operat-
ing outside the purview of Belgrade, UNMIK allayed Albanians’ fear of
return to Serbia and encouraged their cooperation. By retaining authority
over key areas, the international administration simultaneously sought to
mollify the Serbs’ concern that Kosovo was heading towards independence.
Administrative responsibilities over seemingly not-too-sensitive areas such
as culture, youth, health, agriculture and environmental protection were
devolved to the Albanian-dominated PISG. Powers over sovereignty-related
issues such as policing and the judiciary, external relations and the adminis-
tration of public and socially owned enterprises, were still vested with the
SRSG. However, the slow transfer of administrative competencies fuelled ten-
sions between UNMIK and Kosovo Albanian elites. For them, international
staff members most of whom were posted several times in Kosovo preferred
staying longer there, as it was much safer than other fragile or war-affected
countries and its geographical location made travelling to their home
countries much easier. The portrayal and treatment of Kosovo as an ‘emer-
gency’ or ‘crisis’ situation would thus be favourable, as it provided a powerful
rationalization for their continued presence, while the actual objectives of
reformation and self-government capacity would be delayed.79
The second phase covers SSR initiatives undertaken between UNMIK’s
official adoption of the ‘standards before status’ policy in December 2003
and the Kosovo Parliament’s unilateral declaration of independence in Febru-
ary 2008. The ‘standards’ policy conditioned the opening of the status nego-
tiations on demonstrated progress in eight areas including functioning
democratic institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement, refugee return,
economic development, property rights, dialogue with Belgrade and the
KPC.80 However, the benchmarks approach perceived as another delaying
tactic by the majority Albanians, waiting for the international community
76Heinemann-Gruder and Paes, ‘Wag the Dog’.
77Rees, Security Sector Reform, 20.
78Ibid.
79Personal communication with a member of the expatriate community in Pristina, Sep. 2015.
80‘Standards for Kosovo’.
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to recognize their independence declared in 1991, failed to deliver its antici-
pated outcomes in terms of democratic governance capacity-development.81
As discussed earlier, it is misguided to assume the locals to be a hom-
ogenous community that passively complies with the ‘ownership’ of externally
produced policies. They use different means to resist, reject or transform the
political agenda they are imposed to ‘own’. This is exemplified by the March
2004 violence which made it abundantly clear that the status diplomacy could
no longer be delayed. During the two-day riots, 11 Albanians and 8 Serbs were
killed, more than 900 people were wounded, around 4,500 people were dis-
placed, over 700 properties belonging to minorities were damaged, and
dozens of UNMIK and Kosovo Force (KFOR) vehicles were set on fire.82 In
a detailed report submitted to the UN Security Council in November 2004,
Kai Eide, a top Norwegian diplomat appointed as Special Envoy of the Sec-
retary-General, called for ‘a more dynamic standards policy with achievable
priorities’, as the existing strategy based on the ‘implementation of highly
ambitious’ benchmarks was an ‘untenable’ approach that lacked credibility.83
Following a comprehensive standards implementation review, Eide rec-
ommended commencement of status talks a year later.84
The talks mediated by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, acting as
UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, were held in Vienna throughout 2006,
with no mutually agreed solution reached. Ahtisaari announced his interna-
tionally endorsed proposal in February 2007. The Ahtisaari plan proposed
the separation of Kosovo from Serbia and deployment of a European
Union-led international civilian presence to replace UNMIK.85 Kosovo, in
other words, would be legally recognized as sovereign, while its domestic
self-government capacity component would be strengthened by international
agencies. This administrative arrangement, referred to as ‘supervised indepen-
dence’, was modelled on the protectorate-like administrative system put in
place in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the Dayton Peace Accord. The
Ahtisaari plan also sanctioned the development of a national security sector
through creating new institutions such as the Kosovo Security Force (KSF),
Kosovo Security Council (KSC) and the Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA),
while recommending the presence of the NATO-led security force staying
for an unspecified period of time.86 The proposed actions would be structured
upon the recommendations made in the internal security review conducted in
2005–06 to provide a road map for Kosovo’s future security architecture.87
81ICG, ‘Collapse in Kosovo’, 2.
82UN, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission’, para. 3.
83Eide, ‘Report of the Situation in Kosovo’.
84Eide, ‘Comprehensive Review’.
85UN, ‘Report of the Special Envoy’.
86Ibid., Annex XI.
87Anthony Cleland Welch et al., Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review.
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It is noted in the review document that a holistic and inclusive approach
was taken to deliver a comprehensive threat analysis based on the method-
ology devised by the British Government’s Security Sector Development
Advisory Team (SSDAT),88 which undertook a ‘scoping mission’ in March
2005 to provide recommendations for the structure, objectives and work
plan of Kosovo’s internal security review.89 However, the lead author of the
said review writes elsewhere that upon SSDAT advice the process was in
effect directed by an internationally dominated steering committee consisting
of high-level representatives from UNMIK, the PISG, religious and commu-
nity leaders, even though Soren Jessen-Petersen, SRSG at the time, was report-
edly in favour of ‘a review by and for the people of Kosovo’.90 Indeed, even the
idea of examining the internal security situation in Kosovo was introduced by
a British general who witnessed the UK-led security sector reform project in
Sierra Leone, and persuaded Jessen-Petersen on the need for a similar process
in Kosovo before the status talks.91 The operating capacity of the steering
committee was also reportedly hampered by the resistance from both Serbs
and some Albanian political parties from the beginning. While the former
refused to be part of what they perceived to be a predominantly Albanian
and international community-oriented body, the latter viewed it as being
biased towards a particular party (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo Party),
which held the majority of the security sector-related ministries.92
When Arnstein’s ‘ladder of participation’ is applied to the analysis of the
review process, elements of ritual engagement can be identified, including
therapy, placation, informing and consultation. First, the review project
came as a problem-solving initiative following the March 2004 violence to
outline and ‘cure’ the internal security ‘pathologies’ in the UN-run territory
(therapy). It was proposed by a foreign general based on his prior experience
in another country and endorsed by UNMIK and other international actors
seeking to rescue the stagnated relations with the local political leadership
through a holistic and ‘locally owned’ approach to institutional capacity build-
ing. As exemplified by Jessen-Petersen’s remarks on the catalysing role of the
violent riots: ‘March 2004 was a message to all of us, the locals and the
internationals, that we had to change directions and more diligently pursue
security sector reform in Kosovo.’93 Second, the review was managed by a
high-level steering committee that included hand-picked Kosovar agencies
while executive responsibilities resided with international agencies (placa-
tion). However, the process was boycotted by both Serbs and some Albanian
88Ibid., xiii.
89Cleland Welch, ‘Security Sector Review in Kosovo’, 47.
90Cleland Welch, ‘Appraising the 2006 Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review’.
91Ibid.
92Ibid.
93Quoted in Bajraktari and Parajon, ‘Future of Kosovo’s Security Sector’. http://www.usip.org/publications/
the-future-of-kosovos-security-sector (accessed June 9, 2016).
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political groups. Third, the organization of town hall meetings and use of
media tools such as TV and radio programmes, social media and billboards
for greater public awareness and deeper public understanding of security
issues94 exemplify the one-way exchange patterns Arnstein refers to in the
context of informing activities. Fourth, it remains unclear to what extent
the feedback ordinary Kosovars provided through consultative mechanisms
such as surveys and the ‘have your say bus’ travelling across villages and
urban areas was taken into consideration by power holders, as decision-
making authority over policy recommendations resided with international
agencies (consultation). This is reflected in the neglect of the local demands
for a national defence force95 and the recommended creation of a lighter
force (i.e. the KSF), as later endorsed in the Ahtisaari plan, which avoided
reference to a Kosovo army. Fifth, the review process which purportedly
cost over US$2 million, was obstructed by competing political agendas, devel-
oping in parallel with status talks and a separate bilateral security review
undertaken by the USA.96 Lastly, there was little public awareness about the
findings and recommendations of the review report as it was distributed to
policy circles only and quickly disappeared from public view (informing).97
The final phase is focused on the developments relating to Kosovo’s
strategic security orientation since the declaration of independence. The
SSR-related activities undertaken during this period are characterized by a
mixture of consultation, informing, partnership and delegated power. The
institutional reform process has developed on the basis of the Ahtisaari
plan, which was incorporated into the constitution that entered into force
in June 2008. This included the disbanding of the KPC and its transform-
ation into the KSF. Established as a lightly armed small force responsible
for delivery of civil protection and disaster response tasks, the KSF can be
deployed for overseas peace operations, humanitarian operations and train-
ing and exercise programmes.98 It is trained by NATO and, according to a
senior government official, the KSF is currently an institution somewhere
‘between a civilian security force and an army [… ] [that is planned to]
transform into an army in the medium term’, implying receipt of military
training.99 The government’s SSR measures also included a policy-planning
process to formulate a national security strategy (NSS) under the leadership
of the newly created Kosovo Security Council (KSC). However, the process
94Cleland Welch et al., Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review, 5.
95It is noted in the review document that ‘should the international community attempt to deny an inde-
pendent Kosovo its own defence force, action would be taken to create such a force. The ISSR [Internal
Security Sector Review] further believe that such an outcome would work against the progress that has
been made to bring security to Kosovo and the region as a whole.’ Ibid., xviii. See also, ibid., 140.
96Saferworld, ‘Internal Security Sector Review’.
97Interview with Florian Qehaja, Director of Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, Pristina, Mar. 2015.
98‘Law No. 04/L-177 on Overseas Deployment’.
99Interview, Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, Pristina, Jul. 2015.
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was reportedly obstructed by the highly interventionist approach of the
International Civilian Office (ICO)100 which was established as a supporting
office for the International Civilian Representative (ICR) mandated to
‘supervise’ the capacity-development of Kosovo’s institutions including
the security sector, as stipulated in the Ahtisaari plan (consultation).
From the perspective of the ICO officials, the strategic planning, it is
argued, should have focused on general aspects of ‘human security’ rather
than the ‘real security risks and threats’ facing the country such as northern
municipalities’ refusal to recognize Pristina’s authority, as discussion of
these issues was deemed to be ‘detrimental to security and stability’.101
The first draft prepared by local experts was arguably completely rewritten
by the ICO staff and submitted to the KSC Secretariat towards the end of
2009102 (informing). It was not even deliberated in the Parliament despite
this being required by Kosovo’s constitution.103 Additionally, it has
neither been published nor put into implementation, even though the gov-
ernment, under strong international pressure, announced the document was
approved in 2010.104 Resisting the externally imposed strategies in the NSS
by ignoring or not implementing the document, the Thaci Government
declared in early 2012 that a new strategic security review would be initiated,
leading to both the 2006 UK-managed review report and the 2010 ICO-
‘advised’ strategic document being shelved indefinitely.
Due to operational delays arising from a lack of clear timeline, changing
institutional roles, weak inter-agency coordination and budget deficits, the
review was eventually completed in March 2014 with the government’s
approval of its produced results.105 The published end product entitled Analy-
sis of the Strategic Security Sector Review of the Republic of Kosovo outlines the
country’s security priorities and the role of its security institutions from a
state-centric, defence-focused perspective.106 It sets out safeguarding
Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as the primary security objective
and formulates the creation of a national army towards this objective. Other
security priorities include the gradual transfer of security and defence respon-
sibilities from the NATO-led international security presence, development of
‘good neighbourly relations’ with Serbia, prevention of radical Islamist and
fundamentalist groups’ operations in the country, withdrawal of the foreign
military and civilian presence and reducing poverty.107
100Blease and Qehaja, ‘Conundrum of Local Ownership’.
101Ibid.
102Ibid.
103Interview, Gap Institute, Pristina, Jul. 2014.
104Forum for Civic Initiatives (FIQ) et al., ‘New Kosovo Security Strategy Formulation’.
105Derks-Normandin, Linking Peace and Durable Solutions, 15; Cleland Welch, ‘Kosovo’s Home-Grown SSR’.
106Government of Republic of Kosovo, Analysis of the Strategic Security Sector Review.
107Interview, Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, Pristina, Jul. 2014.
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The process was undertaken under strong US influence focusing on
regional political issues and security challenges.108 It was carried out by secur-
ity professionals and directed within closed circles through a ministerial-level
steering committee, with almost no civil society participation (informing).
The committee did not involve any representatives from the Serbian commu-
nity and was chaired by the Minister of the KSF rather than the KSC which is
constitutionally mandated to provide recommendations for security policies
and strategies.109 From a methodological perspective, the 2014 review was
clearly a product of a less inclusive approach compared to the process in
2005–06. On the other hand, in terms of its ‘outcomes’ focusing on issues
of internal and external sovereignty facing Kosovo in the post-independence
period, the 2014 review might be said to be ‘owned’ more than the previously
released one.110 The 2006 process, as discussed earlier, was based on broader
public consultation initiatives including town hall meetings, surveys and the
use of a ‘have your say’ bus, TV, radio and social media. However, the
initiation, planning, execution and outcomes of the said process were all
determined by UNMIK and other international actors. The 2012–14 review,
on the other hand, was initiated and led by the Kosovo authorities that appar-
ently chose to work with the US authorities to be able to facilitate their desired
outcomes (partnership).
On the other hand, the government’s envisioned army project, reportedly
decided in consultation with NATO,111 has encountered delays in implemen-
tation since former PrimeMinister Hashim Thaci’s declaration in March 2014
that the KSFwould be transformed into a regular defence force by 2019.112 One
source of the surrounding delays is the international community’s ‘stability
first’ policy which has sought to prevent any initiatives that may potentially
provoke a strong reaction from Serbia and Russia and disrupt the conditions
of stability established in the Balkans region by the NATO intervention.113
In this regard, the position the USA and other key external actors will take
in accordance with considerations of the regional balance of power will
clearly determine the prospects of the planned transformation of the KSF
into a national defence force. Four NATO members (Spain, Greece,
Romania and Slovakia) have so far refused to recognize Kosovo and the KSF
transformation is therefore potentially a divisive issue for the organization.
Since its declaration in July 2013 that the KSF reached its full operational
capacity to assume more responsibility for providing security in Kosovo,
NATO appears to have confined its role to training and capacity-development.
108Cleland Welch, ‘Kosovo’s Home-Grown SSR’.
109Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED), Kosovo Security Sector Observer.
110Interview, Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, Mar. 2015.
111‘Thaci: Pristina Has NATO’s Approval’.
112‘Kosovo to Create Own Army’.
113Interview with Florian Qehaja, Director of Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, Pristina, Mar. 2015.
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For instance, in a joint press conference with Prime Minister Isa Mustafa
during his visit to Pristina in January 2015, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg
responded to the questions on the government’s plans to create an armed force
by reaffirming NATO’s capacity-development responsibility: ‘[i]t’s not up to
NATO to decide how the security forces of Kosovo is developed. What we
are doing is that we are doing capacity building for the Kosovo Security
Forces within its present mandate.’114 Through framing its role as one of tech-
nical and KSF transformation as a domestic affair of Kosovo, NATO seeks to
maintain its own internal cohesion and keep the organization out of the sur-
rounding political debates and controversies, thereby evading responsibility
for any moves that may trigger regional instability.
Pristina authorities for their part, as it appears in the newsletters and
annual reports released by the Ministry of Kosovo Security Force (MKSF),
are using bilateral partnership frameworks to realize their desired outcome
of transforming the KSF into an armed force and creating a Ministry of
Defence responsible for its civilian oversight. In the 2014 annual report, for
instance, it is noted that ‘the MKSF and KSF [… ] together with our
friends from the United States have developed detailed plans and programmes
that precede the process of evolution of the KSF in[to] the Armed Forces’.115
In a newsletter released in November 2015, KSF Minister Haki Demolli states
that ‘[w]e presented our needs to our partners and received practical and well-
thought-out proposals’.116 However, it remains unclear as to what specially
these needs were and how they were identified, as there has been no report
or document relating to the needs assessment of the KSF development pub-
lically shared yet.
One thing is clear though. The Kosovo leadership aspires to assert full
sovereignty and exercise dominant decision-making authority over its dom-
estic affairs through creating a defence force that will assume the responsibil-
ity of providing security from the NATO-led KFOR. The government’s
planned security architecture, in other words, illustrates what Arnstein
describes as delegated power. Although the ICO’s departure in September
2012 was presented to the domestic audience as the end of ‘supervised inde-
pendence’ established by the Ahtisaari plan, in reality the country has
remained dependent on a large civilian and military presence for its security
and institutional development. While the EU’s rule of law mission (EULEX)
retains certain executive powers (such as EU judges and prosecutors perform-
ing judicial proceedings in the north of the country),117 Kosovo’s external
114NATO, ‘Joint Press Point. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_116807.htm?selectedLocale=en
(accessed June 9, 2016).
115Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, Annual Report 2014, 5.
116‘Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force Newsletter’. http://www.mksf-ks.org/repository/docs/
Newsletter_November_2015_Frame.pdf
117Under its current mandate, international judges and prosecutors are ‘embedded’ in Kosovo institutions,
and they will not take on new cases and transfer competencies to the Kosovo judicial system with the
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protection as well as internal security in the Serb-dominated northern part of
the Ibar river is provided by NATO troops. Kosovo’s claim to sovereign state-
hood has further been undermined by Belgrade’s de facto control over north-
ern municipalities and the opposition of Serbia, Russia, Spain, China and
many others to accept its independence, even though it has so far been recog-
nized by more than 100 member states of the UN. The security situation in the
north characterized by inter-ethnic tensions, a lack of rule of law, restricted
freedom of movement and organized crime remains a serious cause for
concern for many Albanians, while Serbia’s approach towards Kosovo is
one of the widely identified external security threats in public surveys.118
The surveys also found that the KSF is the most trusted institution119 and
its transformation into an armed force appears to be the most supported
policy initiative by the citizens of Kosovo.120 Strengthening the ability of its
own institutions and taking control of security matters are therefore among
the key strategic priorities for the government to exercise delegated power.
On the other hand, it is widely believed by local analysts that the ratifica-
tion of the government’s proposed constitutional arrangements to allow for
the planned transformation process, which requires the affirmative votes of
the Serbian members of the Kosovo Parliament, can only be made possible
through international intervention.121 The formation of Kosovo’s national
army, which has received strong opposition from Belgrade, has been at the
centre of a political bargaining between the Kosovo Albanian and Serbian
parties.122 Its use as political leverage was apparent during the political
process leading to the creation of a special court for trial of war crimes alleg-
edly committed by the KLA, which is viewed as an outcome of increasing
Western pressure for a concession by both Albanian and Serbian deputies
in exchange for their preferred policy outcomes.123 The transformation of
the KSF requires a double majority in the Parliament, meaning the approval
by two-thirds majority of the 100 Kosovo Albanian MPs plus by two-thirds of
the 20 ethnic minority MPs in favour of the proposed constitutional amend-
ments. Serb MPs have so far been reluctance to endorse the proposed amend-
ments and Pristina authorities are reportedly considering alternative options
such as changing the Law on the Kosovo Security Force only. While it remains
to be seen how this political process will evolve, the current negotiations
exception of the northern part of the country where ‘EULEX will remain in charge of judicial proceedings
until the EU Facilitated Dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade brings a solution for the judiciary’. ‘Short
History of EULEX’, http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,44,197 (accessed 12 Aug. 2015).
118Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, Kosovo Security Barometer, Dec. 2014.
119‘Kosovo Police and KSF Most Trusted Institutions, KIPRED Survey Finds’, http://www.kosovapress.com/
en/nacional/kipred-nxjerr-policine-dhe-fsk-ne-si-me-te-besueshmet-48599 (accessed 26 Aug. 2015).
120Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, Kosovo Security Barometer, Dec. 2015.
121‘The Establishment of Kosovo’.
122Hajdari, ‘Kosovo Serbs MPs Say “No”’.
123‘Draft Law on the Armed Forces’; ‘Kosovo MPs to Vote’; Ezik, ‘Under Western Pressure’.
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between the government and international authorities over the formation of a
national army and NATOwithdrawal illustrate attempts to redistribute power
(partnership) and exercise dominant decision-making authority over defence
and security that traditionally fall under state sovereignty (delegated power).
Conclusion
SSR implementation in ‘fragile’ or ‘conflict-affected’ countries is a sensitive
process. It goes beyond technical tasks and challenges (such as the planning
and delivery of training programmes and the availability of skills, expertise
and funding) to include political difficulties. Donors have advocated insti-
tutional reforms aiming to instil and consolidate liberal democratic principles
and practices of accountability, transparency, civilian control of armed forces
and the rule of law that in effect require redesigning the way in which political
power is distributed and exercised. Creating winners and losers, the reform
process may trigger instability and even the resumption of violence. The
(direct or indirect) involvement of foreign actors in processes of drafting
security and defence-related laws and policies also often creates tensions
between donors and national governments. In addition to being a politically
sensitive exercise, SSR implementation has so far been characterized by
uneven results. Despite gradual improvements in public security conditions,
many ‘fragile’ or ‘conflict-affected’ countries remain dependent on the pres-
ence of foreign military and civilian agencies for security provision and insti-
tutional capacity-development. It is against this background of political
sensitivities and policy failures that the notion of promoting ‘ownership’
through locally driven or contextually sensitive approaches has gained cur-
rency and been utilized by both external donors and domestic actors to legit-
imize their policies and improve outcomes.
Outcomes, on the other hand, are determined by power to influence
decisions and their implementation. Both outcomes and power are a matter
of degree and they evolve through actors’ interactions in a relational
process. Actors’ mutual dependencies determine the degree of power they
exercise. Drawing upon this conceptual framework which takes actors’ chan-
ging motivation and capacity as a key unit of analysis, in this article I have
sought to demonstrate how different outcomes of SSR ‘ownership’ have
emerged in Kosovo over time as a result of different patterns of, and
changes in, power relationships between domestic and international actors.
Indeed, Kosovo’s experience is illustrative of showing how the principle of
local ownership embedded in the discourses of international and domestic
actors is in practice characterized by their acts of legitimization and appro-
priation in an attempt to achieve their preferred outcomes in a dynamic
context.
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Legitimacy has constituted an important source of power for both Kosovar
and international actors involved in a relationship of mutual dependencies.
For Albanian elites, independence from Serbia could only be achieved with
international support for their claim to self-determination. The effectiveness
of the international engagement in Kosovo, on the other hand, was dependent
on the cooperation of local elites in the work of UNMIK. The SSR activities
undertaken during the initial phase (1999–2003) reflects this mutually rein-
forcing agenda. The formation of several transitional institutions such as
the KTC and the PISG exemplifies international agencies’ efforts to encourage
leading Albanian parties’ participation in the process of institutional restruc-
turing. While being described as channels for participatory decision making
by UNMIK officials, these institutional mechanisms were in reality marked
by different elements of ritual engagement including manipulation, therapy
and informing. They had no real decision-making authority as all the execu-
tive responsibilities were vested with UNMIK. The concentration of formal
powers in international agencies, however, does not necessarily mean that
the Kosovo actors were completely powerless or lacked resources to reject
or transform the internationally imposed policy frameworks. The abolition
of the ‘standards before status’ policy and the opening of status talks following
the 2004 riots exemplify the local coercive capacity to change or appropriate
the externally set benchmarks and policy agendas.
The 2006 internal security review conducted in parallel with the status talks
is another example of legitimization and appropriation. It was initiated to
revitalize the stagnated political environment in Kosovo and restore the
strained relationships with the domestic elites whose cooperation and compli-
ance were essential for the legitimacy and effectiveness of the internationally
led institution-building process. It was, however, realized as a problem-
solving exercise to ‘cure’ the territory’s internal security ‘pathologies’ felt
strongly during the 2004 riots (therapy). In terms of methodology, the
review was premised on a holistic and inclusive perspective, evidenced by
the collection of public inputs through surveys and the ‘have your say’ bus.
However, Kosovars’ preference for the creation of an army was disregarded
and the formation of a lightly armed security force (KSF) was recommended
in both the review and the Ahtisaari plan (consultation). While not fully satis-
fying the local demands, the review and its proposed actions were approved by
the political leadership whose priority at the time was formally separating
from Serbia and maintaining the much needed international sympathy for
this objective.
With the recognition of independence, mutual dependencies took a new
form. Kosovo’s ‘internationally supervised’ independence meant continuing
international engagement with the capacity-development of its institutions
including the security and justice sectors, while the Kosovo authorities
sought to redefine the parameters of power relationships with their foreign
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partners. The process of developing the country’s national security strategy is
a case in point to illustrate how these power-based interplays have developed.
The strategic document was largely viewed as the imposition of outsiders’ will
due to ICO officials’ interventions. In the face of strong pressure, the govern-
ment had to approve the strategic document but resisted its implementation
and initiated a new internal review process in 2012. Another example is the
proposed transformation of the KSF into a national army that includes the
devolution of responsibility for security from NATO. The government’s
efforts to create an army that will be in charge of security represent an aspira-
tion to assert full sovereignty both internally and externally (delegated power).
However, the planned transformation is a challenging task for the govern-
ment as it requires changing the constitution which seems unlikely to occur
given the clear Serb opposition. The local leadership is aware of the need
for international backing for realizing its project. In an attempt to garner
international support, which could be seen as another example of legitimiza-
tion and appropriation of actions through ‘ownership’, the Kosovo authorities
emphasize Kosovo’s self-sufficiency through improving its own administra-
tive and institutional structures including defence capabilities.124
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